Amman Security Colloquium
"South Africa’s Transition To Full Democracy"
Biosecurity, Biological Weapons Nonproliferation, and Regional Cooperative Mechanisms”
President F W De Klerk
The Former President
The Republic of South Africa
Speech in
Arab Institute for Security Studies
Amman - 22 June 2009

Twenty years ago South Africa was caught in the grip of a seemingly irresolvable conflict. The National Party government was increasingly isolated in the international community; the country was involved in a downward spiral of insurrection and draconian states of emergency; and the economy was lurching from crisis to crisis. Very few international observers believed that there was any hope for the peaceful resolution of our problems.
There seemed to be no common ground between the contending parties: white South Africans - and particularly Afrikaners - were deeply committed to the preservation of the right to national self-determination for which they had struggled for 350 years; they were concerned about the chaos and collapse of democratic governance that had followed independence in most African countries; and they were seriously worried about the influence of the South African Communist Party within the ANC’s tripartite coalition. This was not simply a question of ‘reds under beds’. As late as September 1987 the South African Defence Force had been involved in large-scale conflict with Soviet and Cuban led forces in Southern Angola; we knew that a majority of the members of the ANC’s National Executive Committee were also members of the SA Communist Party; and we also knew that the SACP planned a two-phase revolution that would culminate in the establishment of a communist ‘people’s democracy’. The National Party strongly favoured a free enterprise economy, a federal state, strongly entrenched minority rights and limited central government.
 
On the other hand, the ANC/SACP Alliance came from a radical socialist tradition. It was committed to nationalisation and the immediate introduction of an egalitarian society. It advocated a strong central government and state intervention in the economy to achieve its social purposes. It viewed the National Party in terms of its experience of apartheid and of its struggle against the security forces.

The IFP, the third major party, had chosen to combat apartheid from within the system. For this reason it was distrusted by the ANC with whom it had for some time been waging a low intensity war in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. It was strongly federalist; it supported free market principles and had its main support base among the Zulus of Natal.

The three parties also had very different views about the process that should be followed in writing a new constitution for South Africa. The ANC wanted an election for an assembly that would draft the new constitution. The National Party and the IFP insisted that the constitution should first be drafted by the main contending parties and only then should the first democratic elections be held.
What enabled these parties and the other twenty-three that joined them in the multiparty negotiations to bridge the enormous chasms that divided them? I should like to suggest the following. Whether we liked one another or not, there could be no long-term solution that did not involve all the major parties and population groups of our country. Our problems could be solved only through negotiation. Any attempt by any party to continue to impose its will on its opponents by force would simply lead to the destruction of the country and the economy. A successful outcome to our negotiations would often require genuine concessions and painful compromises by all parties. We would have to put the bitterness of the past behind us and search for genuine national reconciliation. We needed a strong Constitution that would provide the basic rules for our new society; that would guarantee the rights and security of all our individuals and communities.
 
There were also certain objective circumstances that had created a window of opportunity for us:
 The collapse of global communism in 1989 removed the major strategic concern that had dominated the thinking of the previous government for decades. In particular, it eliminated the threat of Soviet expansionism in southern Africa and it greatly weakened the influence of the South African Communist Party within the ANC’s tripartite alliance. At the beginning of the 1990s there was no longer any serious debate with regard to the economic policies that would be required to ensure economic growth in a future democratic South Africa. The devastation that central planning and state controls had wrought on the economies of Eastern Europe was there for all to see. Throughout the negotiation process, all sides received strong encouragement from the international community to persevere in their difficult attempts to reach peaceful accommodation. There was a sense of reassurance in the willingness of major powers to encourage all parties to work for genuine democratic solutions.

It was factors such as these that enabled us, in December 1993, to reach basic agreement on a Transitional Constitution, despite the numerous crises, boycotts and walk-outs, and violence that we experienced during the process. The key compromises that lead to our agreement are now a matter of record:
 We overcame our differences on when and how the new Constitution should be written, by accepting an historic compromise: the negotiating parties would first reach agreement on a Transitional Constitution in terms of which a new parliament would be elected. The new parliament, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, would then write our final Constitution.
The final Constitution would, in turn, have to be adopted by a two thirds majority and would have to comply with thirty-four immutable constitutional principles that would already be included in the Transitional Constitution. We agreed that for the first five years after the election there would be a Government of National Unity, which would include all parties that received more than five percent of the vote.
We agreed that South Africa would henceforth include nine provinces with substantial powers of their own. We agreed that all those, from all sides, who might have committed politically motivated offences during the period of our national conflict before 6 December 1993 would have a right to amnesty.

The result of this process was the adoption in December 1993 of a Transitional Constitution which made provision for a fully democratic system of government based on the rule of law, with guarantees for the full range of human and civil rights. The constitutional agreement that we reached is a monument to the fact that, given the right circumstances and a serious commitment from all sides, even the most intractable disputes can be resolved in a peaceful and negotiated manner.
It means that even in the most difficult situations there is an alternative to the horror and hopelessness of violence, war and division. However, it does not provide any room for complacency.

Looking back on our experience we can identify the following key factors that contributed to the success of our negotiations:
 There must be a genuine commitment to a negotiated solution by all the main parties. The balance of forces must be such that no party should think that it can successfully impose its will on the others. Perceptions of relative power - and projections of future shifts in the balance of power - are crucial. It is such perceptions that will often determine the demands and concessions that parties will make at the negotiating table.
Parties must abandon their stereotypes of their opponents. Once they get to know their opponents, they usually discover that they are not nearly as bad as they had imagined - or as they had depicted them in their own propaganda. To their amazement they will often discover that they share many of the same aspirations for the future. They all want peace. They all want prosperity and freedom. They all want security and a better life for their children.
Search for points of common interest. Parties must search for such areas of shared interest and build binding agreements on them. In the process, they will find that it much easier to reach agreement on the future than on the past.
Timing is crucial. Had we started our negotiation initiative earlier - say, in the middle ‘seventies - it is doubtful that the National Party government would have been able to take its followers with it. If we had launched our initiative too late, we might have entered the negotiation process when the balance of power had begun to shift against us - as Ian Smith did in Zimbabwe. History sometimes opens a window of opportunity, when all the forces involved are ripe for negotiation. It is the task of statesmen to recognise such windows and lead their followers through, before history once again slams the window shut.
Inclusivity. Parties cannot dictate with whom they will or will not negotiate. If all the parties to the conflict are not present - and not represented by their chosen leaders - negotiations will not succeed. One of the major problems that we encountered was the boycotts of the talks that were initiated first by the ANC and then by the IFP. It was essential for us to persuade all the major parties to rejoin the process before the elections. This we ultimately managed to do with only eight days to spare!
Leadership. It is equally important for parties to be able to take their constituencies with them. Strong and determined leadership is essential. An important, but time -consuming - factor in our negotiations was the lengthy process for participants to consult their constituencies before important decisions. Leaders must be able to develop personal relationships based on mutual trust and confidence. They must also develop a strong sense of patience and the fortitude to deal with the frequent frustrations and obstacles. In our case - and despite frequent sharp differences of opinion - Nelson Mandela and I always somehow managed to defuse the major crises which developed during the negotiation process.
Mechanisms. In our negotiations we found it very useful to develop special mechanisms to deal with deadlocks and problems. One such mechanism was a two-man committee of senior officials, whose task it was to suggest compromises and solutions when deadlocks and problems arose.
Risk. Ultimately, negotiators must be prepared to take risks to assure a successful outcome to their efforts. Few agreements will ever be absolutely water-tight and at some juncture a leap of faith will usually be unavoidable.
Win/win outcomes. The success of negotiations will depend on the ability of the negotiators to address the reasonable interests and concerns of all parties. One-sided solutions will not last and simply make the eventual resumption of genuine negotiations more difficult.

Finally, the most important lesson from South Africa’s experience is that peace makes all the sacrifices, risks, and crises worthwhile.
Consider the peace dividends that South Africa has received since 1994:
We produce 45% of the GNP of sub-Saharan Africa
We have rejoined the international community. Our country is widely respected and plays a leading role in promoting the well-being of our continent. There are more foreign embassies in Pretoria than in any other capital in the world with the exception of Washington.
Our sportsmen and women have attained new heights in international competition: we are the rugby world champions - again; we are the top one-day international team in world cricket; since 1940 South Africans have won more golf major championships than the any other country except the United States. We will be hosting the Soccer World Cup in 2010. Our country has become an increasingly popular tourist destination – and tourism now contributes 8% to our GNP - more than gold. Some of our restaurants and hotels are counted among the best in the world in international surveys.
Our car and truck industry also contributes about 8% of GNP – with exports of the highest quality Mercedes-Benz and BMWs to countries all over the world.
According to a recent survey three South African cities – Cape Town, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth – are regarded as being among the best 100 cities in the world in which to live.
More importantly, life is getting better for more and more South Africans. According to the Financial Mail the black middle class grew by 30% in 2005 - adding another 421 000 adults to our middle-income group. The growth of the black middle class is not only a spur to consumer growth in general - it is also a major factor in promoting stability.
However, it is not only the black middle class that has benefited from the new South Africa. Since 1994 we have been building an average of 500 houses per day - most of them for disadvantaged communities. Huge progress has also been made in bringing electricity and water to South African households.
None of this detracts from the very real problems that confront us which include the AIDS pandemic;
the problem of poverty – that almost half our population has yet to benefit materially from our new democracy;
the closely linked problem of unemployment;
the huge skills shortage;
the need for a balanced transformation process.
However, the problems of peaceful societies can be resolved with hard work; appropriate policies and the best use of national resources. The problems of societies divided by conflict can ultimately be solved only by peace.

Finally, perhaps the greatest lesson that we have learned and that we are still learning is that you never really solve problems in human relations. There is no point at which you can clap yourself on the back and walk away from your success. All human relationships - including those between communities in multicultural societies - require constant and continuing attention, care, communication and commitment. Without these, the most promising relationships very soon unravel.

Our greatest challenge in South Africa is to keep the miracle of our peaceful transition to democracy and justice alive and successful. This will require open communication, consideration and scrupulous commitment by all parties to the historic agreements on which our new society is based. The best contribution that we in South Africa can make will be to work day and night for the continued success of our own complex multicultural society. We must continue to show the world that there is another way, that different cultural communities can coexist harmoniously within the same States, that there is a peaceful solution to even the most complex problems and disputes.

These are among the factors and processes that enabled South Africa to reach agreement on our peaceful transition to multi-racial democracy. Some of them were developed specifically for our own complex situation. Others may have a more universal application.