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Presented Abstracts
"Confronting Biological Threats:
Biosecurity, Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation, and Regional Cooperative
Mechanisms”
Amman, Jordan
October 27 - 29, 2008
Planning and capacity building of human and
animal health systems-
the example of avian influenza
William K. Ampofo1
In cooperation with Lawson Ahadzie2, M.
Agyen Frempong3, E.B.M. Koney3, Gaari-Kwaku3, E.
Barnor3, Ernest Lamptey4, Richard Suu-ire4,
Gregory Raczniak5, Richard Killian6, Fulgence
Sangber-Dery6, Michael Adjabeng2, Kofi Bonney1,
Michael Wilson1, Diana Boakye7, Joseph Ankrah7,
Harry Opata8, Alexander Nyarko1 and George
Amofah2.
1Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical
Research, 2Ghana Health Service,3Veterinary
Services Directorate, 4Game and Wildlife
Division, 5US Naval Medical Research Unit-3,
6Quality Health Partners/Engender Health,
7National Disaster Management Organization and
8World Health Organization.
Introduction:
Since 2003, highly pathogenic Avian
Influenza (AI) has spread to Asia, Europe and
Africa and is a major health threat for domestic
poultry and humans. In Africa, weak
infrastructures and institutional capacities are
major limitations for appropriate prevention and
response strategies. In 2005 in Ghana, the
Ministries of Health, Agriculture,
Forestry/Lands/ Minerals and Interior, together
with international development partners, created
the Avian Influenza Working Group. This body has
coordinated the development of Ghana’s plans and
actions to address the risk of an AI pandemic.
Methodology:
A rapid review of key systems for disease
surveillance and control in animals, humans and
disaster preparedness was conducted at national,
regional, and district levels. This led to
national (and regional) AI preparedness and
response plans based mainly on internationally
recognized phases of pandemic influenza with
trigger activities for initiation of further
responses. Following the 2007 bird flu outbreak
in poultry in Ghana, updating of the national
framework is underway with various activities in
the animal/ human health sectors plus public
private partnerships.
Results:
Lessons learned include the recognition that
multi-sectoral approaches can be effective,
improved capacity of human/animal health systems
to detect and manage AI infections, nationwide
awareness/education on biosecurity and the
conduct of simulation exercises to heighten
preparedness.
Conclusion:
There is a pressing need to improve the
capacity of human/animal health facilities to
better manage highly infectious pathogens across
Africa. The AI pandemic threat illustrates the
requirement for local anticipation, coordination
and continuous preparation towards dire global
health issues.
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Biosecurity in Jordan - Medical and
Industrial Waste Treatment Plant
for Greater Amman and Middle Governorates
Mr. Luciano Borin
President, Action Stream International -
Italy
The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan (GoJ) wishes to outsource to a private
investor the design, financing , construction,
operation and maintenance of a Medical and
Industrial Waste Treatment Plant (the Plant)
under a Public-Private Partnership scheme (the
Project) structured on the basis of a
Build-Own-Operate and Transfer (BOOT) contract
between the GoJ and a special purpose company (SPC)
to be formed by the private investor under the
Laws of Jordan.
With the exception of a small unit established
in the north of the country , Jordan does not
have centralized facilities to treat medical and
industrial wastes. A few hospitals operate
treatment units which are not fitted to meet the
environmental standards required by Jordan law
in terms of gaseous emissions and disposal of
liquid effluents and solid residues. Industrial
wastes are handled through ad-hoc arrangements
which are difficult to monitor and are often
non-compliant with environmental regulations.
The resulting risks of health hazards for the
population deriving from the above situation are
substantial and have prompted the GoJ to
promote, in line with international experience,
private investment for the establishment of a
modern centralized treatment facility which will
handle both medical and industrial wastes. It is
envisaged that medical wastes will be sourced
from the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) and
Middle Governorates, while industrial wastes
will be sourced from the GAM only. The Project
includes not only the treatment of the wastes,
but also their collection, transport to the
Plant site at Ghabawi and transport and disposal
of treatment residues from Ghabawi to the
special wastes landfill at Swaqa.
The foreseen plant will include:
1 – A medical and industrial waste incineration
plant of approximately 18,000 tons/year capacity
and an
ancillary pre-treatment facility for oily waste of
5,000 tons/year capacity, at Ghabawi ( 23 km
from central
Amman);
2 – A physico-chemical treatment plant of 2,000
tons/year capacity at Ghabawi;
3 – A solidification plant for waste and
residues, with a capacity of approximately 4,400
tons/year at
Ghabawi; and
4 – A Class I landfill for slag and residues
with a capacity of approximately 17,000
tons/year at Swaqa (150
km from Amman).
This document illustrates the Project key
features and outlines some lessons learnt during
the negotiation process that can be applicable
to future BOOT initiatives in similar and other
fields.
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Best Practices for Laboratory Standards in
Biosafety, Biosecurity and Collaboration on
Technology Development
Dr. Robert Bull
FBI Laboratory - US
The development of laboratory best practices
are critical to the acceptance of biological
safety and security policies. Key to any plans
for biological security is an accepted set of
standards for biological safety. Biological
safety standards have been developed through the
input from experts in the laboratory and are
intended to protect those that work in the
laboratory, as well as the broader community.
Biological safety practices rely on a consensus
of levels that define the practices as
appropriate to work with biological materials.
This is similar to the approach that is taken
for biological security. Using a parallel
approach to biological safety, biological
security of laboratories working with biological
materials have implemented practices to meet the
legal and administrative requirements necessary,
as defined by governmental oversight. Insuring
input from those that execute biological
security policies is intended to maximize the
public benefit. Any plan for biological security
should define the location the work is
performed, the engineering requirement necessary
to control the material in the facility, and the
personnel working with the biological material.
Defining where the work is performed allows for
oversight of the facilities, insuring that work
is performed safely and with appropriate
resources for securing biological materials.
Knowing who is working with the biological
materials ensures that training and appropriate
background considerations conform to the
standards that have been set.
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Role for Export Controls in Biosecurity and
Non-Proliferation
Dr David M. Coates
Cooperative Threat Reduction at the Defence
Science and Technology Laboratory - UK
Much money and effort is currently being put
into improving biosecurity of laboratories
working with dangerous pathogens and toxins.
However, biosecurity does not stop at the
perimeter fence of such laboratories, which are
often asked to supply micro-organisms and other
dual-use materials to other countries as part of
the legitimate and important fight against
disease. Effective export controls need to be in
place to prevent the inadvertent transfer of
dangerous pathogens and toxins into the hands of
those who might want them for offensive BW
purposes, or allow them to be diverted for such
use. Such controls help states fulfil their
obligations under the BTWC, but to be effective
they need to be internationally consistent and
relevant, competently and expertly assessed and
implemented, and understood by both exporters
and officials.
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How to Face Bioterrorism: The Role of
Clinical Microbiology
Maria Rita Gismondo
Clinical Microbiology Unit, BSL4 Lab, L.
Sacco University Hospital of Milan, Italy
The CDC and other health institutions in Europe
have established a Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Program that addresses public health
response to bioterrorist actions. These public
plans include disease surveillance, laboratory
diagnosis of biological agents, epidemiologic
investigation, communication (between local,
state, and federal public health authorities),
preparedness planning, and readiness assessment.
The skill of the Lab of Microbiology is the
cornerstone of the plans. In fact, its role is
the health surveillance, by detection practice,
the rapid diagnosis, the epidemiologic
investigation and it contributes to the
implementation of control measures. According to
the biosafety level, the lab can face different
pathogens and it contributes to the public plan.
The first line labs (Level A) with II level
cabines rules-out and forward organisms; Level B
and C Labs with BSL-2 facility + BSL-3 Safety
Practices have a role of Limited confirmation
and Transport; Level D Lab BSL-4 is the Highest
level characterization (Federal). The labs
network is visualized as a pyramidal structure.
In Europe the organization is at national level
end each country defines the own plan of
intervention.
The Author shows the Class A microrganisms and
their possibility of detection, the
epidemiological network and new diagnostic
approach to bioterrorism emergency.
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Biotechnology Research: Biorisks and
Biosecurity Responses
Elisa D. Harris
Senior Research Scholar, Center for
International and Security Studies at Maryland -
US
Bioterrorism is a major concern of many
Western policymakers, but a source of danger
involving modern biology has been largely
overlooked: the possibility that legitimate
biotechnology research in academic, government,
or industry laboratories could result, either
deliberately or inadvertently, in destructive
consequences. Research with potentially
destructive applications is being carried out in
laboratories around the world. Well known
examples of such dual-use research include the
mousepox experiment in Australia and the
poliovirus experiment in the United States. This
presentation will explore both the nature of the
dual-use problem in microbial biotechnology
research and potential measures to mitigate the
threat.
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Handling CBRN Incidents in the Netherlands
Dr. Sally Hoffer
Dutch National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment (RIVM),
Advisory Service for the Inspectorate,
Environment and Health – Netherlands
Due to the decentralised emergency response
model in the Netherlands the local and regional
authorities lack the possibility to acquire and
maintain expertise and facilities necessary to
cope with none-routine incidents like
small-scale CBRN incidents. In these incidents
RIVM and the Dutch National Laboratory Network
play a key role in generating, collecting,
integrating and scientific interpretation of
data and converting these data into information
that is directly usable by authorities in
charge. When for example a pathogen has been
released, the Netherlands have several systems
in place to respond effectively
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Dual-use Research, Bioweapons and Biosecurity
Dr. Iris Hunger
Head of Research Group for Biological Arms
Control
Carl Friedrich von Weizscker Centre for Science
and Peace Research
University of Hamburg - Germany
Because of the strong dual use character of the
life sciences, biosecurity measures always apply
to legitimate activities, even if intended to
prevent illegitimate ones. The extent of the
modern life sciences makes it impossible to
control all dual use activities. Biosecurity
measures have to focus on activities with a
particularly high misuse potential. There is no
agreement so far what such particularly
dangerous activities are. One approach uses the
types of agents involved in classifying
activities as particularly dangerous. Another
approach considers activities to be of
particular concern if certain results are
expected or accidentally achieved.
It is to be expected that activities of concern
are frequently carried out in maximum
containment facilities and in biodefence
programmes. Both, therefore, need to receive
particular attention when designing biosecurity
measures.
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Regional Cooperation Mechanism for Enhancing
Biosafety and Biosecurity
Ali Karami, Ph.D
Research Center of Molecular Biology,
Institute of Military Medicine
Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences -
Iran
Rapid advances in Molecular Biology,
Biotechnology, Recombinant DNA Technology,
Genetic Engineering, Omics (Genomics,
Proteomics, transcriptomics and metabolomics),
Nanobiotchnology, Synthetic Biology, System
biology and other emerging, Converging and
disruptive science and technologies over the
past decade have brought enormous benefits to
medicine, public health, food industry and
agriculture but have created concerns to reduce
ant threat to humanity.
Differentiating between Biosafety and
Biosecurity
As simple definition, Biosafety protects
people from germs and biosecurity protects germs
from people.
The main question is how we can protect our
society, region and the world from misuses,
abuse, dual use or misconduct in research,
development and applications of these new
technologies.
Several points and steps are critical to expand
the culture of the issue to implement the Safety
and security across the nations, region and the
world:
1- Clear definitions and understanding of the
terms and implications.
2- Differences in the national scientific and
technological capacity in planning, regulation
and national
legislations.
3- We can not implement and enforce single
international biosafety and Biosecurity
regulation for all countries.
Biosafety and biosecurity procedures and practices vary
enormously from country to country according to
level of technological development therefore "one size fits
all" approach should be avoided in dealing with
the issues.
4- Steps should be taken to first educate, build
the capacity, enhabce the culture, knowledge,
basic
requirements and personnel…. To implement the regulations.
5- The Universities, research institutes,
laboratories and scientists should be encouraged
to convene
seminars, workshops and prepare research papers to raise the
awareness. Training programs and materials
on biosafety and biosecurity regulations and biomedical
ethics should also be improved and inserted in
university curricula.
6- Scientific community and industry that play a
significant role in the development and
application of
biotechnology should be involved in devising educational
programs.
7- Biosafety and biosecurity measures and
regulations should avoid any restrictions on
exchange of scientific
discoveries in the field of biology for research,
development, prevention, diagnosis and treatment
or
disease and other peaceful purposes.
8- The promotion of international scientific and
technological cooperation and exchange of
information
according to article X of the BWC regarding results of
scientific research constitutes yet another
effective
assurance for the use of bio sciences to remain peaceful.
9- Finally all of these regulations should not
leave individuals and scientists with the
impression that these
standards are not designed against them or their scientific
activities.
Regional and international actions
We need to expand our activities in the
following areas
1- Close collaboration of scientists of the
region for exchange of ideas, information
sharing exchange of
science, technology and transparency.
2- Establishing networks among researchers.
3- Active participation of scientific societies
(NGOs)
4- Regional meetings, Seminars and workshops to
discuss the national capacities, weaknesses and
experiences for national legislations.
5- In order to improve implementation measures,
it is encouraged to strengthen coordination with
relevant
international organizations, such as the WHO, FAO, OIE to
engage in mutual feedback on the discussions
concerning biosafety and biosecurity.
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Bioterrorism Threat
Barry Kellman
International Weapons Control Center
DePaul University College of Law – US
What’s the gravest security threat facing
humanity? A nuclear explosion would be horrible,
but terrorists would be hard pressed to get
nuclear bomb. They certainly could not make one.
No one should discount this threat, but neither
should we be blinded to more realistic dangers –
the dangers of bioterrorism. Terrorists have
announced their desire to attack us with a
biological weapon which is much easier to make
than a nuclear bomb. Germs can be carried
undetected through any airport in a small
shampoo or perfume bottle. A contagious disease
would spread misery without regard for
boundaries, race, religion, or nationality.
Altogether, techniques that were on the
frontiers of science only a decade or two ago
are rapidly mutating as progress in the
biological sciences enables new ways to produce
lethal catastrophe. Every passing day it becomes
slightly easier to commit a violent catastrophe
than it was the day before. For terrorists who
seek to rattle the pillars of modern
civilization and perhaps cause it to collapse,
effective use of disease would set in motion
political, economic, and health consequences so
severe as challenge government’s ability to
maintain our security. In an attack’s wake, no
one would know when it is over, and no official
could credibly tell us where and when we might
be safe. To stop modern civilization in its
tracks, bioterrorism is the way to go.
We must appreciate the global nature of the
problem. Perpetrators from anywhere can get
disease agents from virtually everywhere. The
knowledge needed to weaponize pathogens is
available on the Internet. An attack can be
prepared through easy networks of transnational
communication. Public health responses would
have to be internationally coordinated. New
modes of international legal cooperation would
be needed to investigate the crime. Indeed, the
threat of bioterrorism shrinks our world into an
interdependent neighborhood.
Yet, bioterrorism dangers are unnecessarily high
because national and international anti-bioviolence
strategies are gap-ridden, often incoherent and
not globally observed. As a result, we are all
virtually naked in the face of unacceptable
dangers. No other threat presents such a stark
contrast between severity of harm and a failure
of leadership to reduce risks.
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Biodefense in the Middle East
Steve Kornguth
Center for Strategic and Innovative
Technology
and
Director, Biological and Chemical Defense, the
Institute for Advanced Technology, the
University of Texas at Austin - US
Emergent and/or intentionally caused highly
infectious diseases are low probability events
that have profound and highly disruptive
consequences on economies and the political and
medical infrastructure of a nation or region.
Ensuring the safety of the populace against a
biological attack relies heavily upon the
ability to predict, prevent or mitigate clinical
symptoms of disease. Capabilities for predicting
and negating emergent disease or biological
attack include: 1) monitoring changes in the
wellness of humans and livestock; 2) robust
sensor systems, with very low false
positive/negative events, that can detect
abnormal levels of pathogen or host markers of
infection. Effective communication of emergent
threat to central and local governments can
enable these authorities to formulate a plan of
action and initiate countermeasures that may
mitigate the threat. Mitigation involves
preparedness of responders and sustaining the
capability of responders to maintain high levels
of performance during potentially long-lasting
operational activities.
Fused data from multiplexed sensors responsive
to a wide range of pathogens and host markers
would provide the excellent capabilities for
early alert of threat from biological agents.
Such data would decrease the risk of false
positive/negative alerts that can result in an
inoperable system. Genomic databases for humans
and pathogens will provide much-needed
information on the susceptibility/resilience of
the host population to the agent and the
vulnerability of the pathogenic virus and/or
bacteria to vaccines, antibiotics or antivirals.
The increase globally, in the number and
capabilities of biotechnology firms and research
units, enables the rapid identification of
emergent biothreat agents in local nation/states
and the rapid pinpointing and strain
identification of intentionally released
pathogen into the populace or the unintentional
compromise of pathogen containment. Tracking and
detailing the production of vaccines on a global
scale will enable rapid resource allocation in
the case of disease outbreak. Certain
geographical regions and human populations (i.e.
particularly mobile individuals or people with
genetic susceptibility to disease or who are
immuno-compromised) may serve as vectors for
transmission of disease, and the geographical
location of these areas and habitations can be
used to calculate risk factors. Local wildlife
can, in turn, provide a reservoir of pathogenic
infection that provides long-term sanctuary for
disease. An integrated pathogen detection and
identification system coupled with an alerting
system can reduce the impact of emergent disease
or intentional threat. Such regions and hosts
should be more closely monitored for prediction
and detection of an event.
This Conference also has a focus on threats from
chemical agents and from toxic industrial
chemicals. The ability of chemical toxicants to
modulate the immune response of hosts to
infectious agents creates a nexus of interest
for joint efforts in biological and chemical
threat management.
International cooperative efforts in the
detection of and response to biological and/or
chemical agents could potentially increase early
detection capabilities and produce additional
resources including stockpiled pharmaceuticals
and trained responders who can relieve limited
resources in the area of attack. Securing such
cooperation, particularly biological, chemical
and radiation defense communities of the Middle
East, is a priority in preparing a response for
endemic disease outbreak or intentional attack.
The first step towards establishing a
multi-national response is to establish and
maintain a team of trusted investigators amongst
the proposed partner states. This trust can be
built by providing information to industry and
biomedical researchers; the researchers could
archive pathogen samples and document vaccine
production in the partnering states. A
multinational response team could provide the
international credibility needed regarding
release of an alert of emergent disease. The
natural resources and human capital of each
country can best be put to use in a combined
defensive strategy: for example, the highly
trained medical professional force of one nation
could be dispersed to threat locations in a
neighboring state while the biotechnology
resources of a developed nation can be
contracted to produce therapeutic aid.
Establishing trust in the present will ensure
that such byways remain open to rapid
cooperative responses in threat situations. The
opportunity provided by this conference in
Jordan is of great relevance because Jordan
plays a unique role as a hub of communications
for Middle East nations and maintains relations
with all surrounding states. Jordan and Arab
Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS) can
initiate a leading role in the coordination of
health emergency response networks for the
benefit of the entire Middle Eastern region.
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Asian view on National and Regional
Legislation Implementation
Ajey Lele
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
– India
Post, Sixth Review Conference of the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) one of the
major areas of discussions have been the
importance of National and Regional Legislation
Implementation to avoid proliferation of
Biological Weapons/technology. The major focus
of the UN meetings like the Meeting of Experts (MX-Aug
2007) have revolved around identifying and
discussing ways and means to enhance national
implementation, including enforcement of
national legislation, strengthening of national
institutions and coordination among national law
enforcement institutions. From the Hague
protocol of 1907 to, the 2004 UN Security
Council Resolution 1540 the UN has always asked
the state parties (in some form or other) to
take and enforce effective measures against the
proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery
and related materials.
At the backdrop of above this paper attempts to
provide an Asian view on the National and
Regional Legislation Implementation. The paper
highlights the measures taken by few important
Asian states in this arena giving due cognizance
to their political, social and scientific
(technological) compulsions.
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Regional Engagement to Enhance Biosecurity:
Lessons from the Australia / Indonesia co-hosted
BWC Regional Workshops
Robert Mathews
Head, NBC Arms Control in the Human
Protection and Performance Division of the
Australian Defense Science and Technology
Organization (DSTO) – Australia
This presentation will commence with a
discussion of the rationale and objectives of
the Biological Weapons Convention (Biosecurity)
Regional Workshops co-hosted by Australia and
Indonesia in the South East Asia / Pacific, will
then discuss of some of the major outcomes
flowing from these workshops, and will conclude
with lessons that may be applicable in the
development of regional co-operation for the
enhancement of biosecurity in other regions.
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Outreach, Awareness-raising and Codes of
Conduct
Robert Mathews
Head, NBC Arms Control in the Human
Protection and Performance Division of the
Australian Defense Science and Technology
Organization (DSTO) – Australia
This presentation will commence with a
discussion of the importance of outreach and
awareness-raising among the various biological
science and biotechnology communities, based on
the obligations under the Biological Weapons
Convention and the dual-use dilemma in
biological sciences, and will then discuss the
role of various Codes of Conduct (including
Scientific Society Codes and Workplace Codes) in
enhancing biosecurity, and raising the barriers
to BW-proliferation and bioterrorism.
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Disaster Risk Reduction, Global and National
Frameworks and Mechanisms
Mostafa Mohaghegh
Head of UNISDR Regional Office for West Asia
and North Africa, Cairo
The statistics show a growing trend of
disasters triggered by natural hazards in the
recent decades. The disasters continue to impose
huge possess on communities and nations and
hamper the socio-economic development capacities
and programs in particular in the developing
countries. The vulnerability caused by the
imbalanced development and environmental
degradation contributes to natural hazards
become destructive disasters and leave larger
negative impact on communities.
The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) adopted by
the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in
Kobe, Japan in 2005 and endorsed by the United
Nations General Assembly in the same year,
presents a series of global Strategic Goals and
Priorities for Action for the period of 2005 to
2015. The HFA promotes recognition of disaster
risk reduction as top development priority at
national, regional and international levels and
provides a number of actions to be taken by all
stakeholders in various areas such as risk
understanding and assessment, institutional
capacity development, communication and early
warning and complementarity between risk
reduction and disaster preparedness and
response. The HFA also provides a number of
measures at national level such as inclusion of
the disaster risk reduction at highest national
development planning and establishment of
National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.
The main objectives of the mentioned frameworks
and mechanisms are to give the due recognition
of the importance of disaster risk reduction and
prevention as top priority and to ensure a
multi-stakeholder and coordinated approach in
reducing disaster risks. Considering the
increasing challenges the nations and
communities are facing such as climate change
and environmental degradation, unplanned urban
growth and poverty, developing more effective
response measures such as reducing
vulnerabilities and increasing the resilience of
people and communities seem to be a better
solution in long term.
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An Overview on Biological Weapons Threat
Natividad Carpintero-Santamaría and Guillermo
Velarde
Institute of Nuclear Fusion – Polytechnic
University of Madrid - Spain
Presently, conventional biological agents and
conventional biological research has turned into
a interdisciplinary science: biotechnology or
biological engineering whose legitimate use, if
maliciously intended, would enlarge the scope of
the traditional threat posed by conventional
bacteriological agents.
Related to biological threat, we can underline
the absence of biological attacks to people in
the worst years of terrorism during the Cold
War. However there are several reports on
different incidents in which agriculture and
food have been main targets, being this last
aspect another important factor to be
considered. To this respect, biotechnology
industry with the provision of materials
(bioreactors) and new methods of research in
cellular biology, microbiology, biochemistry,
etc represent another challenge in the
non-proliferation of biological weapons.
The BWC (1972) with the prohibition of
development, production and stockpiling of
biological and toxin weapons has proven to be
insufficient to stop its proliferation. Firstly,
because several countries have not joined it,
and secondly, due to the absence of a protocol
that allows the verification of the compliance
of the terms by the State Members.
Many of us wonder if it is possible to prevent a
covert biological attack. This paper analyzes
the present situation of potential biological
threat with a special emphasis in the efforts
carried out by governments, institutions and the
scientific community in order to establishing a
program bound to minimize any biotechnology
mismanagement or misuse, which could lead to
both a qualitative and quantitative strategic
damage.
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Developing Biosafety and Biosecurity
measures: A case of Uganda
Maxwell Otim Onapa
Deputy Executive Secretary of Uganda
National Council for Science
and Technology (UNCST) - Uganda
Globalization has collapsed distance and made
the world economically, socially, politically,
culturally and scientifically integrated.
New challenges are appearing, these range from
bioterrorism to transboundary spread of epidemic
diseases; rapid spread of harmful germs and
diseases.
The global PH systems in particular under strict
scrutiny since animal diseases have rocked
global PH, security, trade and economies
There is an elevated risk that biological agents
could be used for bioterrorism and as weapons of
mass destruction in the future (Fear of military
use limited).
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The Emerging Biological Weapons Threat And
Proliferation
Sudha Raman
Research Coordinator - The United Service
Institution of India (USI)
Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation
(USI-CS3) - India
The Problem
Of the triad of weapons of mass destruction,
essentially it is the nuclear weapons that have
remained at the centre of world focus and to
some extent the chemical weapons. The fight
against possession and production of biological
weapons (BW), which could in fact be categorised
as a silent threat, with a fatality rate
probably greater than nuclear weapons, has at
best remained muted. Ironically, in spite of the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
of 1975, not to forget the Geneva Protocol of
1925 and the Australia Group, number of states
continue with their research and development in
biological weapons.
The contextual relevance of biological weapons
threat arises out of its possible possession by
non-state actors i.e., the terrorist groups,
independent or supported by state actors. Here
the attempts by the Taliban and the Al-Queda to
expand modes of terrorism through the medium of
use of biological weapons need to be considered.
Biological weapons proliferation thus is serious
in that it is increasing the probability of
serious bioterrorism incidents. This altered
international security environment compels us to
work towards broader nonproliferation activities
and stem and resolve the grave risks posed by
bio-terrorism and outbreaks of infectious
diseases.
The Scene
The use of anthrax threat in the US was no minor
accident. The presence of large, well-resourced
and in some cases state-supported organizations
that train and programme the non state actors is
extremely worrisome. Equally worrisome is the
presence of organizations that would use
biological weapons to further certain goals.
Such organizations could use biological
pathogens that are easily available.
It is when surveying the security measures that
one needs to take into account a few vital
facets of BW like the dual-use nature of
biological materials and equipment, the trivial
amounts needed to cause an outbreak of diseases,
and the relative ease with which these can be
produced or procured. Biological agents are
easier and cheaper to produce than either
nuclear materials or CW agents, and the
necessary technology and know-how is widely
available. Any nation with even a modest
pharmaceutical industry is capable of producing
BW agents.
These are weapons that act as a poor but
effective counter to the offensive posture of a
more technologically sophisticated adversary.
Many countries believed to possess such weapons
or to be developing them will not admit to
having such a programme. Even past offensive
programmes lie buried. There is barely enough
info on the doctrines (if any), intent and
decisions on use of BW stored in a country’s
arsenal.
India and BW
India has ratified the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) on 15 July 1974 and has
pledged a commitment to abide by it. India
itself is in the throes of threats from
non-state actors and has to find means to fight
the menace. A joint effort to fight and restrain
possession and use of BW is in the interests of
all. It is in this background that my paper
would design its answers to the following
questions from an Indian perspective:-
(a) How many nations seek to acquire different
types of BW and for what?
(b) Can proliferation of BW/agents be controlled
at the source?
(b) In the light of the threats from non state
actors, how can efforts for nonproliferation be
leveraged? How
does one go about with an internationally-constructed,
effective bio-threat nonproliferation system?
(d) What is the course to be adopted to
successfully stem dangers of use of BW by state
and non state
actors?
My paper will answer these queries from the
Indian point of view and wherein lies the
concern of India regarding these weapons, how
much efforts will be put by my country towards a
world free of such weapons by strengthening,
especially while framing its foreign policy, its
relations with countries that may not be very
open with its BW programme.
------------------------------------------------
National Implementing Measures for Effective
Biosafety and Biosecurity — VERTIC’s National
Implementing Measures (NIM) Project
Scott Spence
Chemical and Biological Weapons Legal
Officer at the (VERTIC) - UK
The presentation provides an introduction
about VERTIC objectives and functions.
Additionally, the following themes will be
addressed:
• what national measures States should adopt to
prevent and prohibit the proliferation of
biological weapons
• how States can accomplish the effective
implementation of national measures,including
biosecurity measures
• the benefits of comprehensive national
implementing measures
On “what”, the presentation will discuss:
• National measures (primary legislation,
regulations) to regulate and monitor activities
involving controlled
agents and toxins
• Additional measures to ensure full
implementation of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention and
related provisions of UNSCR 1540
On “how”, the presentation will discuss
VERTIC’s National Implementing Measures Project,
which covers:
• Comprehensive analysis of States’ existing
legislation
• Direct, cost-free legislative drafting
assistance in capitals
• VERTIC’s legislative drafting tools and fact
sheets
------------------------------------------------
Public-Private Partnerships for Global
BioSecurity
Mr. John Stammreich1, Dr. Thomas Austin2 and Dr.
Charles David3
1Vice-President
Global Strategy, Boeing Company.
2Director,
CBRNE Programs, Boeing Company.
3Senior
Scientist Biosecurity, Boeing Company.
The world faces signficant biological security
challenges. There currently is no effective and
affordable global strategy in place. Existing
plans, capabilities, research and development
are costly and limited in coordination and
effectiveness. Proposed biosecurity solutions
must balance effectiveness, affordability, and
public confidence. In order to build more
effective global biosecurity, governments must
enlist the resources of the private sector. The
establishment of a "Global BioSecurity
Public-Private Partnership (P3)" involving the
public sector, private sector, academia and
non-governmental organizations is an important
first step for improved global biosecurity. The
P3 will serve to create a consensus among the
stakeholders in addressing biosecurity
countermeasures priorities. The P3 will serve to
share requisite information and data to evaluate
alternative countermeasures using risk
management based analytical methodologies to
support informed dialogue and decision making.
------------------------------------------------
Responding to Intentional Biological Threats
in Agriculture – Agroterrorism, Post-harvest
Food Bioterrorism and Emergency Preparedness
Raymond A. Zilinskas, Ph.D.
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS),
Monterey Institute of International Studies, US
The food supply systems of most countries are
comprised of two phases – the pre-harvest and
post-harvest phases. Each is vulnerable to
sabotage by criminals or terrorists, although
the second is the more likely to be so targeted
since it is easier to breach and affect. This is
so because many or most food processing,
packing, and distribution facilities neglect to
check on the background of the persons they
employ and lack adequate physical security to
prevent outsiders from accessing the food and
beverage products processed and packaged by
these facilities.
This presentation will identify the
vulnerabilities of each phase to sabotage by
using a threat assessment schema developed by
Bruce Hope of the Oregon State Department of
Environmental Quality. Experience from a
table-top exercise conducted in Salinas,
California, that modeled a deliberate sabotage
of fresh spinach with Shigella dysenteriae will
be used to illustrate aspects of the
presentation. The presentation will end with a
discussion of measures that have been taken at
the federal level to safeguard the U.S. food
supply system and that may have lessons for
other countries.
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